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Government and private entities in the Caribbean Basin coun-
tries recently have been intercepting United States domestic satel-
lite signals carrying pay-television programs intended for United
States cable viewers and have rebroadcast the programs without
the consent of the United States copyright owners. The unautho-
rized interception of the broadcast signal and the unauthorized re-
broadcasting of the program material, otherwise known as satellite
piracy, deprives those United States contributing artists and
broadcasting organizations of their property without
compensation.
United States program owners currently lack assurances of effec-
tive international legal protection of their property rights against
international satellite piracy because United States copyright laws
do not apply outside of United States territory. In addition, ex-
isting multilateral agreements provide only limited protection be-
cause they either fail to provide necessary sanctions against satel-
lite piracy or are so outdated that they do not specifically address
current satellite broadcasting issues.'
*Barnard College, Columbia University, A.B.; Columbia University School of Interna-
tional Affairs, M.I.A.; Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, J.D.
See generally Note, Direct Broadcast Satellites: Protecting Rights of Contributing Art-
ists and Broadcasting Organizations, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 204, 223 (1982).
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Until a new multilateral copyright agreement is designed to pro-
vide comprehensive multinational legal protection against interna-
tional satellite piracy, the most effective immediate solution for
dealing with satellite piracy in the Caribbean is through bilateral
agreements and congressional initiatives as provided for in the
Caribbean Basin Initiative.2 The Caribbean Basin Initiative at-
tempted specifically to combat satellite piracy by conditioning
trade benefits on copyright protection for the United States pro-
gram owners.'
II. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS SATELLITE PIRACY AND WHOSE
INTERESTS ARE AT STAKE?
Television broadcasts generally are made on the basis of con-
tracts under which broadcasters agree to pay program owners a fee
to show their programs to a specified audience located in a defined
geographic area." Prior to the use of satellite communications, the
area of broadcast in the conventional broadcasting system was geo-
graphically limited to the line-of-sight paths between the originat-
ing broadcaster's transmitter and the receiving antennae.' With a
defined area of broadcast, both the originating broadcasters and a
program's copyright holders could control through contractual
terms the area capable of receiving the conventional broadcast. As
a result, the contracting parties had little fear of unauthorized in-
terception.' Similarly, where a program was to be broadcast in a
country or territory not within line-of-sight transmission, agree-
ments or international copyright conventions provided for the
purchase of broadcasting rights by the rebroadcasting organization
in return for royalty payments to the contributing artists. 7 Conse-
quently, if no coypright treaty or royalty agreement existed, the
program material would be withheld from that particular country.8
With the advent of satellite technology, however, the range of
signal coverage has increased far beyond that of the defined, line-
' CARIBBEAN BASIN ECONOMIC RECOVERY AcT, Pub. L. No. 98-67, 97 Stat. 384 (1983). The
CBI is a package of United States trade initiatives proposed by President Reagan to help
the Caribbean and Central American countries revitalize their economies.
3 Id. § 212(2)(b)(5).
' See supra note 1, at 206.
5 Id.
6Id.




of-sight paths of conventional broadcasting.' Organizations and
program contributors consequently have begun to lose complete
control over the area of intended coverage.
Broadcast signals transmitted by satellite begin their journey at
the transmitting center of a ground station and then are transmit-
ted to a high altitude domestic satellite."0 From there, the satellite
converts the signal to a different frequency and retransmits it
down to a cable system or other authorized receiver.1" The space
between the distribution satellite in outer space and the receiving
station on earth extends over one-third of the globe. 2 This area
covered by satellite retransmission, or "footprint,"' 3 "spills over "14
permitting unauthorized parties having the necessary equipment
to intercept the broadcast signals.15 This unauthorized intercepting
and rebroadcasting is known as "satellite piracy" or "poaching. ' ' 0
Over the last decade, as satellite technology became more ad-
vanced, it became increasingly simple for unauthorized ground re-
ceivers to intercept and relay satellite signals to an unintended au-
dience. 7 The satellites in use in 1972 were exclusively point-to-
point satellites, carrying programs from one point to another. 8
Point-to-point satellites are relatively low-powered, are capable
only of transmitting weak signals, and require highly sensitive,
powerful, and very expensive ground stations for conversion and
redistribution of signals. 9 The point-to-point signal is transmitted
to a specific ground station and is incapable of diffusion into ex-
panded areas.20 In addition, because of the satellite's high costs,
only a limited number of operative ground stations existed at the
time point-to-point satellites were introduced, so interception and
rebroadcast rarely occurred.2'
Id.
" See id. at 207-08.
"' Id. at 208.
12 UNESCO, RECORDS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATES ON THE DISTRIBUTION
OF PROGRAMME-CARRYING SIGNALS TRANSMITTED BY SATELLITE 34 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
UNESCO RECORDS].
" Dealing With the Footprints Fallouts, BROADCASTING, July 4, 1983, at 66 [hereinafter
cited as Footprints].
14 See generally id.; see also infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
I See UNESCO RECORDS, supra note 12.
I d.
17 Id.
'" See supra note 1 at 207.




GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
The possibility of satellite piracy increased, however, with the
advent of the distribution satellite in the mid 1970's.22 Distribution
satellites were much more powerful than the point-to-point satel-
lites, and their broadcast signal could be received by many more
ground receiving stations by using much simpler and less costly
equipment than had been previously required.23
The latest addition to the satellite broadcasting technology is
the direct broadcasting satellite, which will further simplify and
lower the cost of the communication process. 4 Unlike point-to-
point and distribution satellites, whose satellite signals must be
converted at highly sophisticated ground stations and then distrib-
uted to home television sets, the direct broadcast satellites are suf-
ficiently powerful to send signals directly to home receiving anten-
nae without passing through a ground station.2 5 As a result, direct
broadcast satellites provide the greatest potential for satellite
piracy because the program carrying signal can be intercepted di-
rectly by the public with home receiving sets. 26
Satellite transmission piracy of a program of literary, intellectual
or artistic content violates the rights of the originating broadcast-
ers and program contributors, such as authors, directors, and per-
formers. Satellite piracy, therefore, represents both the theft of
works of the contributing artists as well as the theft of the trans-
missions of the originating broadcasting organizations. In the case
of program-carrying signal theft of a sports event, for example, the
theft would violate the rights of the organizations sponsoring and
financing the event.28 Similarly, the piracy of filmed news pro-
grams transmitted by satellite would violate the rights of news
agencies, television organizations, and the journalists involved.2 9
Ownership rights in the program material generally are renumer-
ated only in proportion to the size of the intended audience. Yet,
12 See Note, supra note 1, at 208.
13 Id.; see also UNESCO RECORDS, supra note 12, at 34.
24 See Note, supra note 1, at 208.
*1 Id.; Ulmer, Protection of Authors in Relation to the Transmission Satellite of Broad-
cast Programmes, 93 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR 3, 6 (1977).
'" Note, supra note 1, at 209.
17 See UNESCO RECORDS, supra note 12; see generally Note, supra note 1, at 204-05.
Chakroun, Questions of Rights in Space Communication, 16 COPYRIGHT BULL. 18, 19
(1982).
Id.
'o Final Act of the International Conference of States on the Distribution of Programme-
Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, May 21, 1974, Draft Report of the General Rap-
porteur, 13 I.L.M. 1446, 1449 (1974).
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when unauthorized parties redistribute programs for commercial
advantage, neither program contributors nor broadcasting organi-
zations profit from the additional coverage. Because originating
broadcasters are unlikely to grant program contributors additional
compensation for the increased viewer exposure caused by the
theft of their program-carrying signal, relationships between
broadcasters and program contributors who hold copyrights in the
programs are in a state of flux.31
If program contributors cannot be ensured copyright protection,
or at least compensation for the theft of their intellectual property,
they may instead choose not to use the satellite at all. Likewise,
originating broadcasters might decide to abandon satellite broad-
casting if they have to pay additional royalty fees for the increased
audience exposure, especially when the fee is excessive." Yet, a
high additional fee or abandonment of the broadcast undermines
the very purpose of using satellites, namely, to achieve both a more
effective and cost efficient means of communication. 3
Within the next four years alone, several countries, including
Brazil, France, West Germany, Japan, and Saudia Arabia, plan to
launch a total of twenty-five satellites designed to transmit televi-
sion programming.3 These satellites will broadcast an enormous
amount of copyrighted material over a vast area of the globe.35 The
more commonplace satellite broadcasting becomes, the greater the
chance of satellite piracy, which grows commensurately with the
increased capability of signal reception in an expanded geographic
area. Therefore, to maximize the benefits of using satellite commu-
nication and to encourage more creative programming, effective in-
ternational laws must be designed to adequately protect the prop-
erty rights of program contributors and broadcasting organizations
against theft of their program material and broadcast
transmissions.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION FOR AMERICAN PROGRAM
CONTRIBUTORS AND BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS: THE
MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
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diction of the United States are not actionable under the United
States Copyright Act30 because United States laws lack extraterri-
torial authority." As a result, when Caribbean countries pirate
United States satellite transmissions, carrying copyrighted mate-
rial intended for United States cable viewers, those countries are
not subject to the United States Copyright Act because the in-
fringement (i.e., rebroadcasting the video performance without the
authorization of the American owners) occurs outside of United
States jurisdiction.3
Therefore, it is important to design a legal framework which en-
sures United States program owners adequate international copy-
right protection. Such a legal framework may appear in the form of
multilateral or bilateral treaties which bind member states. Trea-
ties which merely provide for good faith agreements or coopera-
tion, and do not include binding obligations and sanctions as a
means of enforcement, are not strong enough to guarantee United
States program owners protection against satellite piracy. 9
Furthermore, a foreign nation may accord copyright protection
to United States works by unilateral action. The unilateral action
may take the form of granting national treatment, that is, granting
United States citizens the same copyright protection as that nation
accords its own nationals.40 The unilateral action also may grant
reciprocal treatment to United States copyright owners by giving
those owners the same copyright protection as the United States
grants the foreign nation's nationals."1
Although acts of piracy are inconsistent with the principles in-
cluded in existing multilateral agreements, such multilateral agree-
ments fail to adequately protect United States program owners
against satellite piracy. The existing multilateral treaties either
lack sanctions necessary to prevent satellite piracy, or are outmo-
' Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
37 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 17.02 (1984).
11 See infra notes 114-42 and accompanying text for an in-depth discussion of American
satellite transmission thefts in the Caribbean and the effects on the American motion pic-
ture industry. Satellite piracy is prohibited in the United States by § 605 of the 1934 Com-
munications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1976). However, with regard to Direct Broadcast Satellite
(DBS) systems, private individuals using a backyard earth-receiving antenna may receive
"unedrupted" (unscrambled) satellite video programming for "private," non-commercial
viewing in his own home. Cable Communications Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 705, 98
Stat. 2802 (1984).
39 See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 37, § 17.03 (1984).




ded because of their exclusive application to conventional broad-
casting and thus do not specifically address the problem of satellite
piracy."2
A. International Telecommunications Union and the Radio
Regulations
1. Purpose
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is an inde-
pendent intergovernmental organization related to the United Na-
tions by a special agency agreement. 4' The ITU's goals are to
maintain and extend international cooperation for the improve-
ment and rational use of telecommunications, to promote the de-
velopment and efficient operation of telecommunications facilities,
and to harmonize the actions of nations in the attainment of these
ends." The ITU is responsible for regulating international commu-
nication services, allocating the radio spectrum, increasing the use-
fulness of telecommunication services, and making such services
generally available to the public.'5 With the advent of satellite
communications, the ITU also became the primary body for the
formation of international space law.'6 Furthermore, as a techni-
cally oriented body, the ITU is responsible for seeking more effi-
cient use of both radio frequencies and geostationary satellite
orbits.'7 ITU functions include allocating the radio frequency spec-
trum, registering radio frequency assignments, coordinating efforts
to eliminate harmful interference between radio stations of differ-
ent countries, and improving the use of the radio frequency
spectrum. 48
" See generally Note, supra note 1, at 223.
"' ITU authority stems from a series of international agreements: International Telecom-
munications Convention (ITC), Dec. 9, 1932, 49 Stat. 2391, 151 L.N.T.S. 5; Radio Regula-
tions, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893 [hereinafter cited as 1959 Radio Reg-
ulations]; Partial Revision of Radio Regulations, Nov. 8, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 887, T.I.A.S. No.
5603 [hereinafter cited as 1963 Partial Revision]; Convention to the International Telecom-
munication Conference, Nov. 12, 1965, 18 U.S.T. 575, T.I.A.S. No. 6267; Partial Revision of
Radio Regulations, July 17, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 1527, T.I.A.S. No. 7436 [hereinafter cited as
1971 Partial Revision]; International Telecommunication Convention (ITC), Oct. 25, 1973,
28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 8572 [hereinafter cited as 1973 ITC]. See also 1 G. WALLEN-
STEIN, INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION AGREEMENTS 30 (1979).
" 1973 ITC, supra note 43, art. 4, § 1(a).
15 Id. § l(b).
46 See Note, supra note 1, at 212.
See 1973 ITC, supra note 43, art. 33, § 2.
Id., art. 4, § 2.
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2. Relevant Provisions
The United States and most Caribbean countries are parties to
the International Telecommunications Convention (ITC) and the
annexed Radio Regulations.49 The agreements are binding on the
member states. 0
Article 42(1) of the 1973 ITC provides that "[t]he provisions of
the Convention are completed by the Administration Regulations
which regulate the use of telecommunication and shall be binding
on all members."'51
Article 17 of the 1959 Radio Regulations provides:
The administrations bind themselves to take the necessary
measures to prohibit and prevent:
a) the unauthorized interception of radio communications not
intended for the general use of the public;
b) the divulgence of the contents or any use whatever, without
authorization, of information of any nature whatever obtained by
the interception of radio communications mentioned in [the pre-
ceding paragraph]."
In regard to the Caribbean situation, Article 17 of the 1959 Ra-
dio Regulations would require member Caribbean states to pro-
hibit and prevent unauthorized interception of American domestic
satellite signals not intended for the general public in the Carib-
bean countries. This requirement, as a practical matter, is
unenforceable.
In addition, Article 7, paragraph 428A, § 2A of the 1971 Partial
Revision of the Radio Regulations states that "[iun devising the
characteristics of a space station in the broadcasting satellite ser-
vice, all technical means available shall be used to reduce, to the
maximum extent practicable, the radiation over the territory of
other countries unless an agreement has been previously reached
with such countries. "63
Paragraph 428A has received varying interpretations.6 4 One view
"' The Radio Regulations were adopted and annexed to the ITC at the 1959 World Ad-
ministrative Radio Conference in Geneva. See 1959 Radio Regulations, supra note 43. The
1963 and 1971 International Telecommunication Conferences adopted subsequent amend-
ments to the Radio Regulations. See 1963 Partial Revision, supra note 43; 1971 Partial Re-
vision, supra note 43.
50 See 1973 ITC, supra note 43, art. 2., § 1.
" See 1973 ITC, supra note 43, art. 42(1), para. 147.
a' 1959 Radio Regulations, supra note 43, art. 17.
6 See 1971 Partial Revision, supra note 43, art. 7, para. 428A, § 2(A).
See Note, supra note 1, at 213 n.52.
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maintains that paragraph 428A gives approval and recognition to
the principle of prior consent,55 and thus regards direct satellite
broadcasting without the prior consent of a receiving state as a vio-
lation of international law.56 In contrast, the majority view dis-
misses the issue of prior consent, and interprets paragraph 428A
on strictly technical grounds.5 7 This view maintains that the para-
graph was adopted merely for technical purposes such as avoiding
harmful interference in broadcast transmissions and problems of
unavoidable overspill.55
Unfortunately, the ITU regulations are limited to technical mat-
ters, and the Radio Regulations were designed to control the trans-
mission rather than the content of the signal e.5  The problems in-
volving copyrighted program material contained within the signal
therefore probably exceed the scope of the convention. Further-
more, the ITU is incapable of providing legal protection to the pro-
gram owners because the ITU has no regulatory or judicial author-
ity to enforce its technical regulations, ° which are complied with
voluntarily on the basis of mutual cooperation."' Therefore, the
ITU, as it presently stands, is an inappropriate forum to combat
satellite piracy.
B. The Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne
Convention
The Universal Copyright Convention 2 and the Berne Conven-
tion63 are the two major multilateral copyright treaties offering
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 214 n.54.
58 Id.
11 Straschnov, Legal Protection of Television Broadcasts Transmitted Via Satellite, 17
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 27, 39 (1970). Straschnov proposes creation of a new treaty to
provide protection for the signal itself, regardless of content, and regardless of whether the
content is protected by copyright. Id. Essentially the Brussels Satellite Convention serves
this purpose, except it does not provide protection for direct broadcast satellite signals. See
infra notes 90-113 and accompanying text.
60 See Note, supra note 1, at 213.
*' Id. at 214.
Universal Copyright Convention, opened for signature Sept. 6, 1952, revised at Paris
on July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868.
"8 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for
signature Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Berlin on Nov. 13, 1908, revised at Rome on June 2, 1928,
revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948, revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, revised at Paris
on July 24, 1971, latest revision reprinted in 7 COPYRIGHT 135 (1971).
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copyright protection to authors of literary and artistic works.6 4 The
most significant protection for American nationals under foreign
laws is derived from the Universal Copyright Convention. 5 The
United States is not a party to the Berne Convention.
The Universal Copyright Convention grants national treatment
to works of United States nationals regardless of where the works
are published.60 Such works must be accorded equal copyright pro-
tection in other states which adhere to the Universal Copyright
Convention as those states accord works of their own nationals
first published in their own territory. 7 Problems occasionally arise
when the Universal Copyright Convention's national treatment ob-
ligation has limited effect, such as when one state's copyright laws
insufficiently protect copyrights held by another state's nationals.6 8
In such situations, as in most agreements which provide for na-
tional treatment, the question arises as to a state's obligation to
accord national treatment to foreign claimants and whether such
an obligation applies to rights which are not specifically contained
in the state's copyright laws, but which constitute rights merely in
the nature of copyright. 9
As noted above, the United States is not a party to the Berne
Convention, yet works of United States nationals may still obtain
Berne protection under the "back door" Berne approach of simul-
taneous publication."0 Pursuant to this "back door" Berne ap-
proach, an author who is a national of a non-Berne Convention
country is still entitled to copyright protection for his work in all
Berne member countries, if such work was either first published in
Universal Copyright Convention, opened for signature Sept. 6, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 2731,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S.
No. 7868, 943 U.N.T.S.: - (entered into force July 10, 1974). The Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, 1886 Gr.
Brit. T.S. No. (Cmd. 5167), completed at Paris May 4, 1896, 1896 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. (Cmd.
8681), revised at Berlin Nov. 13, 1908, 1 L.N.T.S. 217, completed at Berne Mar. 20, 1914, 1
L.N.T.S. 243, revised at Rome June 2, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 233, revised at Brussels June 26,
1948, 331 U.N.T.S. 217, revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No.
6932, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868, 828 U.N.T.S. 221
[hereinafter cited as 1971 Paris Revision]. 1971 Paris Revision, reprinted in 4 M. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT App. 25-1 (1984); see also Note, supra note 1, at 217.
" See Note, supra note 1, at 218-19; see also NIMMER, supra note 37, § 17.04[B].
See M. NIMMER, supra note 37, § 17.04[B].
67 Id.
11 Id. at n.6.
69 Id. This problem also applies to the Caribbean nations whose copyrights laws are too
antiquated to effectively deal with those rights involved in satellite broadcasting. See also
infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
10 See M. NIMMER, supra note 37, § 17.04[D][1].
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a Berne country, or if it was published in any given Berne coun-
try.7 Many United States works accordingly have acquired Berne
protection by being simultaneously published in the United States
and in a Berne country such as Canada or the United Kingdom. 72
Simultaneous publication of motion pictures occurs when the
United States film is distributed in a Berne country, in a "sched-
uled, deliberate and comprehensive manner."7
Authors' rights with respect to broadcasting are set forth in the
1971 Revision of the Universal Copyright Convention 74 and in the
1971 Revision of the Berne Convention.75 Article IV(b)(i)(s) of the
Universal Convention protects the authors' "economic interest, in-
cluding the exclusive right to authorize reproduction by any
means, public performance and broadcasting." Article 11(b)(i)(s) of
the Berne Convention provides that:
authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive
right of authorizing:
(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication
thereof to the public by any other means of wireless diffusion of
signs, sounds or images;
(ii) any communication to the public by wire or by rebroad-
casting of the broadcast of the work, when this communication is
made by an organization other than the original one;
(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other
analogous instrument transmitting, by signs, sounds or images,
the broadcast of the work.76
In addition, Article 11 of 1971 Revision of the Berne Convention
applies to the rights of "authors of dramatic works," i.e., motion
picture owners, and gives them exclusive right of authorizing "(i)
the public performance of their works, including such public per-
formance by any means of process; (ii) any communication to the
public of the performance of their works. '7 7 This article would ap-
pear to be particularly applicable to film artists and owners whose
works are rebroadcast by Caribbean broadcasters without the art-
ists' and owners' consent.
While the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright Con-
" Id. § 17.04[D][2][a].
72 Id.
7. Id. § 17.04[D][2][c][iil.
" See supra note 63.
" See supra note 64.
" See supra note 63, art. IV(b)(i)(s).
77 See supra note 64, art. 11.
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vention offer protection to authors of literary, artistic, and dra-
matic works, these Conventions fail to protect other interests in-
volved in broadcast transmissions, such as performers, producers
of phonograms, and broadcasting organizations. 8 Furthermore, it
is questionable whether the two conventions offer adequate protec-
tion against international pirating of domestic satellite trans-
missions.79
The question of adequacy arises because the conventions fail to
address satellite broadcasting within their definitions of broadcast-
ing. Ambiguity exists because the legal definition of "broadcast"
fails to include signals which are not received directly by the pub-
lic.80 The injection of wireless signals into the satellite circuit ac-
cordingly is not a broadcast direct to the public, and therefore is
not governed by copyright laws.81
Originating broadcasters, who normally are required to pay pro-
gram contributors an additional fee for additional broadcast cover-
age, criticize the existing definitions of broadcast because they be-
lieve that the "emitted signal" (i.e., the signal sent to a satellite of
program-carrying signals) should not be subject to a royalty be-
cause it is encoded and not directly receivable by the public. Alter-
natively, a broader definition of broadcast would encompass the
use of broadcast satellites because the emitted signal would be con-
sidered merely a "step" in the entire broadcasting process.8 2
With respect to direct broadcast satellites (DBS), 3 the satellite
" International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms
and Broadcasting Organizations, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 44. Only
a small number of states are parties to the Convention. Id.
11 See generally Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative, infra note 93.
80 The drafters at the 1928 Berne Conference did not envisage the possibility that diffu-
sion may occur via satellite in the form of signals which could not be intercepted by ordi-
nary receiver sets. See Ulmer, supra note 25, at 14. Two conflicting interpretations of the
term "broadcasting" exist in current legal literature. Id. One of the interpretations concep-
tualizes "broadcasting" narrowly as relating solely to the emission of signals received di-
rectly by the public. Id. The other interpretation applies a more expansive meaning to
broadcasting; referring to the emission "toward a satellite of programme-carrying signals
intended for an indirect reception by the public only after the intervention of terrestrial
stations." Id.
8' Ulmer, supra note 25, at 16.
82 Mora, The Future of Direct Transmission via Satellite From the Aspect of the Au-
thor, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SECOND COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 57, 58
(Sept. 17-22, 1979).
83 Direct broadcast satellites are sufficiently powerful to transmit signals for direct recep-
tion by the general public. See Note, supra note 1, at 208 n.24. Direct reception encom-
passes both community reception and individual reception. See 1971 Partial Revision, supra
note 43, at 47. Community reception refers to the "reception of emissions from a space
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signal is relayed directly to the public without an intervening third
party, and home receiving antennae receive the originating broad-
caster's signal directly from the satellite. As a result, DBS trans-
missions have been held to be within the conventional meaning of
broadcast.8 4
Even when the definition of broadcast is expanded to include
DBS, compliance with the Conventions remains troublesome.15
The Universal Copyright Convention and the Berne Convention
both require contractual obligations between the author and
broadcaster in order to assess the payment of royalties in propor-
tion to the intended audience."6 Because it is impossible to ascer-
tain and delimit the area of the intended broadcast when using
DBS, compliance with the Conventions is difficult to enforce at
best.
While satellite piracy clearly is contrary to the uniform concerns
of protecting private intellectual property rights that the Universal
Copyright and the Berne Conventions address, it remains ques-
tionable whether the copyright protection provided by these Con-
ventions also pertains to broadcasts transmitted via satellite.8 7
Furthermore, observance of the provisions of the Conventions is
confined to its member states and would not apply to territories or
countries not signatories of the respective Conventions. Thus,
United States program owners still lack total international legal
protection of their program material transmitted via satellite.
C. The Brussels Satellite Convention
The Brussels Conference, officially known as the International
Conference of State on the Distribution of Programme-Carrying
Signals Transmitted by Satellite, was held in Belgium in May
station in the broadcasting satellite service from receiving equipment, which. . .may have
antennae larger than those used for individual reception, and intended use by a group of the
general public at one location; or through a distribution system covering a limited area." See
Note, supra note 1, at 208 n.24. Individual reception is simply satellite reception by "simple
domestic installations and in particular those possessing small antennae." Id. at 208-09,
n.24.
8 See Note, supra note 1, at 218, n.79.
Id. at 218.
8 See id. For a general discussion suggesting approaches toward contractual obligations
and the determination of royalties paid to the author, see Ulmer, supra note 25, at 34, 36.
17 See Note, supra note 1, at 218-19. Broadcasting, as defined under both Conventions,
does not encompass the use of broadcast satellites. Id. at 219. For a general overview of the
scope of the conventions, see R. BROWN, JR., CASES ON COPYRIGHT 808-23 (2d ed. 1974).
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1974.8 The Conference sought to prevent the retransmission of
satellite signals by unintended distributors.89 The Conference was
the first international conference which attempted to address the
specific legal problems raised by unauthorized interception and re-
transmission of satellite signals.9 0 Forty-seven nations, including
the United States, participated in the drafting of the Brussels Con-
vention in 1974.91 During the next ten years, however, only nine
states ratified or acceded to the Convention.2 The United States
recently ratified the treaty."
The Brussels Satellite Convention does not solve all the prob-
lems raised by satellite piracy though. More specifically, the Con-
vention fails to address sufficiently the interests of all the parties
affected by satellite piracy, such as the interests of performing art-
ists.9 4 The treaty also suffers from being a product of compromise,
and was drafted at a time when satellite piracy was still in its
infancy.9
The Brussels Convention essentially regulates the distribution of
88 Background of the International Conference of States on the Distribution of Pro-
gramme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, UNESCO/WIPO/CONFSAT/42 (May
21, 1974), 13 I.L.M. 1444, 1446 (1974).
89 Id.
" The central question at the preparatory session of the Brussels Conference was whether
affirmative rights granted to the originating organization as a matter of private law should
be counterbalanced by granting correlative rights to the program contributors. See Draft
Report of the General Rapporteur, Brussels Convention, 13 I.L.M. 1449, 1450, para. 10
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention]. Consequently, as a matter of compromise,
no new rights were granted, leaving the states to take their own "adequate" measures to
prevent piracy. See id.
" See id. at 1445.
92 Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted
by Satellite, 20 COPYRIGHT (WIPO) 10 (1984). These nations include: Nicaragua, Kenya,
Mexico, Yugoslavia, West Germany, Italy, Austria, Morocco, and the United States. Id.
93 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROGRAMME-CARRYING SIGNALS TRANS-
MITTED BY SATELLITE, TREATY Doc. No. 31, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 14583,
(Daily Ed. Oct. 12, 1984). The National Association of Broadcasters, the World Conference
of Broadcasting Unions, and the Motion Picture Association of America supported the
United States ratification of the Brussels Convention. Caribbean Basin Initiative, 1983:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 399-401 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative].
" See generally Note, The Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Car-
rying Signals Transmitted by Satellite: A Potshot of Poaching, 7 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. POL. 575
(1974). Satellite piracy infringes on the rights of several diverse interest groups. Id. at 576.
The originating broadcaster is not compensated for the unauthorized retransmission of his
signals, nor do the authors, performers and other contributors to the pirated retransmissions
receive additional compensation and suffer the loss of a potential new market. Id.
11 Id. at 579.
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program-carrying signals transmitted by satellite." The Brussels
Convention deals exclusively with the satellite signal rather than
messages carried by those signals:"7 "the subject of the treaty was
the container and not the content."' Direct broadcast satellite sig-
nals, however, are expressly not addressed in the Brussels
Convention.9
The Brussels Convention distinguishes between the "emitted
signal" and the "derived signal." 100 As defined in the Convention,
the "emitted signal" covers any signal that is transmitted up to a
satellite (the "up-link").1'0 As soon as the emitted signal passes
through the satellite it becomes a "derived signal" whose technical
characteristics are modified to beam the signal back without inter-
ference (the "down-link").'0 2 Although the program-carrying signal
undergoes technical changes during its journey, its program con-
tent nonetheless remains the same.
The Brussels Convention applies to the originating broadcasters
and broadcasting distributors to the extent they fall within the
Convention's definition of "originating organization" and "distrib-
utors."10' 3 The "originating organization" is the person or legal en-
tity that decides what program the "emitted signal" will carry.'0 4
This definition includes the broadcasters and cable origination ser-
vices, but excludes the producers, artists, and creators of the pro-
grams 10 5 because the former control the content of the program
rather than the transmission of the signal itself. This definition of
"originating organization" also excludes the telecommunication au-
thorities and the common carriers. 06 Accordingly, while the Con-
vention addresses the interests of the originating broadcasters, it
ignores the interests of authors, performers, producers of phono-
grams, and other program creators. Protection for the artists and
program creators is provided only indirectly through the general
" Id. at 585.
97 Id.
"s Brussels Convention, supra note 90, at 1456.
' Article 3 of the Brussels Convention provides: "[t]his convention shall not apply where
the signals emitted by or on behalf of the originating organization are intended for direct







" See id. at 1457.
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prevention of piracy.10 1
The Brussels Convention defines the "distributor" as the person
or legal entity which transmits the "derived signal" to the general
public anywhere on earth."'8 The Convention's definition of "dis-
tribution" would not include, however, the physical distribution of
"pirated" phonograms or videotapes made from program-carrying
signals.
A final shortcoming of the Brussels Convention is that it con-
tains no enforcement provision to ensure compliance with its
terms. 0 9 The Convention does, however, require signatory coun-
tries to, at a minimum, recognize the problem of satellite piracy
and act affirmatively to correct it. The Convention fails to define
what such affirmative action should entail nor does it specify sanc-
tions for noncompliance." 0 In sum, although the Brussels Conven-
tion moves in the right direction toward offering program owners
comprehensive protection against satellite piracy, the Convention
fails to provide concrete measures to effect that comprehensive
protection.
Because no existing multilateral agreement provides United
States program contributors and broadcasting organizations with
adequate and effective protection against satellite piracy, the most
effective immediate solution may be accomplished through bilat-
'0' See id., art. 6, at 1448. The limitation of the scope of the Convention meant that the
interests of authors and other program contributors were not addressed in the Final Draft of
the Convention as proposed in a compromise by the Australian delegation. See Note, supra
note 94, at 593. The Australian proposal suggested that any questions concerning authors
and other program contributors be determined in a separate protocol. UNESCO/WIPO/
SAT. 3/23 para. 16 (1973); see also Note, supra note 94, at 593.
108 See Brussels Convention, supra note 90, art. 1, at 1447. Another shortcoming of the
Brussels Convention is that it leaves each contracting state a choice of means for sup-
pressing piracy within its territory, provided that the state chooses to recognize that satellite
piracy is occurring within its territory. See id., art. 2. Article 2 of the Convention states:
"each Contracting State undertakes to take adequate measures to prevent the distribution
on or from its territory of any programme-carrying signal by any distributor for whom the
signal emitted to or passing through the satellite is not intended." Id. Regardless of whether
a contracting state adopts its own criminal, civil, or administrative sanctions to prevent
piracy, the fact that any sanction will be domestic in nature precludes adequate protection
against piracy. See Ulmer, supra note 25, at 8.
' See generally Brussels Convention, supra note 90.
11 The Draft Report of the General Rapporteur noted: "[s]ince the wording of the Nai-
robi draft . . . was accepted as the basis for the Brussels Convention, the Conference did
not discuss at any great length the meaning of the operative words used in Article 2(1). It
was clear, however, that Contracting States are left completely free to implement the basic
requirement of the Convention as they see fit .... The good faith of the States in provid-
ing effective measures against piracy could and should be assumed." Brussels Convention,
supra note 90, at 1149.
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eral negotiations and Congressional initiative as evidenced by the
Caribbean Basin Initiative. This approach is preferable to seeking
a new multilateral agreement because the latter approach would
demand years of extended negotiation to complete.
IV. THE UNAUTHORIZED INTERCEPTION AND TRANSMISSION OF U.S.
DOMESTIC SATELLITE SIGNALS IN THE CARIBBEAN AND THE
CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE
A. The Caribbean Problem: Satellite Piracy and the Motion Pic-
ture Industry
Both government and private entities in the Caribbean Basin
countries recently have been intercepting pay-television signals
carried by United States domestic satellites intended for American
cable viewers and have rebroadcast motion pictures and other
United States programs without the consent of the United States
copyright owners."' The problem of satellite piracy occurs in the
Caribbean because United States satellite transmissions currently
are receivable by anyone with an earth receiver station within the
area covered by satellite retransmission, or "footprint," of the
satellites.' The footprint of United States satellites covers the
continental United States and extends into large areas of Canada,
Central America, and the Caribbean." 3
The unauthorized performance of United States works deprives
the owners of their property without compensation. The unautho-
rized rebroadcast of films to unintended audiences in the Carib-
bean especially harms the United States motion picture indus-
try."4 The film industry often depends on foreign sales to make its
... Foreign 'Piracy' of TV Signals Stirs Concerns, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
The broadcasts include programs from Home Box Office, Cinemax, Spotlight, Cable News
Network, Satellite News Channel, USA Network, and from the "Superstations" of WOR-TV
(N.J.) and WGN-TV (Chicago). Id. at C26, col. 3.
11. See MPAA Urges Action Against Countries Stealing Satellite Feeds, BROADCASTING,
Oct. 24, 1983, at 57 [hereinafter cited as MPAA].
"' Footprints, supra note 13. A possible solution to the Caribbean problem would be the
scrambling or encoding of satellite transmissions, but it remains to be seen if the encoded
system will be sufficiently cost effective for most broadcasters to use, and effective enough to
thwart highly professional pirates. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1983, § 3, at 26, col. 5. Home Box
Office has plans to scramble its signal in 1985. See id.
114 The theft of satellite transmissions threatens to seriously damage the overseas markets
of American films. See id., § 1, at 1, col. 6. In Jamaica, for example, the government-owned
broadcast company showed "Poltergeist," "Missing," "Victor/Victoria," "Rocky III" and
other films not yet released to Jamaican theatres during the summer of 1983. Id.
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motion pictures profitable. 15 Theatrical and television revenues
from the Caribbean, for example, total over $20,000,000 a year. 1 '
Motion pictures generally are not released to theaters in the Car-
ibbean until long after they have been shown on United States do-
mestic cable television by satellite transmissions. 7 Consequently,
once a film is shown on Caribbean television, the market for the
film in Caribbean theaters virtually vanishes. Satellite piracy ac-
cordingly threatens the revenues ordinarily collected by theatrical
and television divisions of United States motion picture com-
panies.
The motion picture industry is more concerned with the inter-
ests of program contributors than it is with the interests of the
broadcasting organizations.' Therefore, in regard to satellite
piracy, the film industry's primary concern is to secure copyright
protection for the content of the signal rather than protection for
the signal itself.119 Preventing piracy of the signal itself affords the
program contributors only indirect protection, similar to the pro-
tection furnished by the Brussels Convention.
Jamaica is one of the Caribbean countries which has engaged in
satellite piracy through a governmental agency. 2 ° The Jamaican
Broadcasting Corporation is a government-run monopoly and regu-
larly intercepts pay-television movies from United States satellites
and rebroadcasts them on Jamaica's only channel without the con-
sent of the American program owners.' 2 ' Jamaica has offered to
pay a flat fee, but rejects a per-film royalty system as too expen-
sive."' The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) nego-
tiated with the Jamaican Broadcasting Company about certain un-
authorized broadcasts, and in September 1983, the Jamaican
government stopped airing the disputed broadcasts. 12 3
Other nations in the Caribbean Basin region which permit their
"' See id. The entire overseas market for American films is estimated to gross $1.25 bil-
lion a year, or 30% of the revenues of American movie production companies. Id.
116 See MPAA, supra note 112.
11 See generally id. at 57-58. Motion pictures are not released to theaters in the Carib-
bean and Central America until 12 to 18 months after the United States theatrical release.
Id.
See generally Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative, supra note 93, at 396.
See generally Footprints, supra note 13, at 66-67.
120 See supra note 114. These actions resulted in a 50% drop in revenues for Jamaican
theaters. See id. col. 1.
1 Id. col. 6.
12' A Rights Dispute in the Caribbean, NEWSWEEK, May 2, 1983, at 21.
123 See supra note 114.
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nationals to intercept United States satellite signals and retrans-
mit the programming carried by those signals without the owners
authorization include Panama, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti and the Cayman Islands. 24 In Belize,
Panama, Honduras and Costa Rica, private businessmen have es-
tablished pay cable (subscription) television systems and are inter-
cepting and retransmitting United States domestic satellite signals
to local subscribers for a fee without royalty payments or the con-
sent of the copyright owners. 2 ' In the Bahamas and the Domini-
can Republic, hotels have installed televisions which receive only
earth station broadcasts. 2 ' These hotels intercept them and re-
transmit satellite transmissions to individual hotel rooms by using
closed circuit television systems. 27 In the Cayman Islands, over
300 individuals own satellite dishes enabling them to intercept
without authorization United States satellite signals carrying cable
and pay television programming."2 '
In justifying their actions, some Caribbean broadcasters argue
that they are giving their citizens an opportunity to share in the
abundance of information and entertainment on which the more
developed world has long held a monopoly. 2 ' Others argue, cor-
rectly, that United States copyright laws may not be imposed on
Caribbean broadcasters because United States laws are inoperative
outside United States jurisdiction."' 0 Caribbean broadcasters fur-
ther maintain that the United States government should be
pleased, from a political standpoint, with the additional exposure
to Western ideals that Caribbean residents receive from the unau-
thorized broadcasts. 31
124 See id.
12 Id. col. 1. For example, the Cable Color Television Company in Costa Rica has charged
its local cable television subscribers between $11 and $31 per month to receive programming
which includes unauthorized broadcasts of CNN, WGN, ESPN, HBO, CBN, WTBS, and
Nickelodeon programming. Id.
126 See generally id. col. 4. A suit filed by MPAA member companies alleging copyright
infringement is pending against a Bahamian hotel. The suit, however, has been pending for
over two years. See Nassau Guardian, March 16, 1983.
127 See supra note 114, cols. 1-2; see also Footprints, supra note 13, at 67.
128 See supra note 114; see Cayman Compass, April 14, 1983.
'2 See supra note 114, col. 2. Furthermore, owners of the foreign television stations that
receive the satellite signals assert that their actions are legal because the laws involving
copyrights and satellite transmissions in their countries are often ambiguous or nonexistent.
Id. col. 1.
155 Id. col. 4.
121 Jamaica's Prime Minister claims that United States movies help keep his nation sta-
ble. A Jamaican lobbyist told the United States Congress that "Jamaica is the West Berlin
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The MPAA companies have been frustrated in enforcing their
copyrights through litigation in the Caribbean Basin area.'32 A
number of the Caribbean countries are not members of the Univer-
sal Copyright Convention and have no copyright relations with the
United States, other than possibly through the "back-door" Berne
approach.133 Moreover, some of the countries' laws are antiquated
and do not address the legal problems of advanced satellite tech-
nology.13 1 Panama's copyright laws, for example, are particularly
unclear as to the protection granted a copyright owner whose work
is intercepted from a satellite transmission and redistributed to lo-
cal cable subscribers. 35
United States claimants in a Carribean nation's jurisdiction also
must deal with complicated and burdensome local procedures in
order to both protect their copyrights and secure powers of attor-
ney.136 Such procedures often prolong litigation and make it ex-
tremely costly.137 A statute typically may require registration of
every motion picture and a deposit of a copy of every film shown in
the country in order to prove copyright ownership."3
Given these difficulties, Caribbean nations obviously do not offer
a desirable forum to litigate copyright violations resulting from un-
authorized interception and retransmission of United States pro-
gram-carrying satellite signals. As a result, the United States mo-
tion picture companies have turned to the United States political
process to attain adequate protection of their property rights in
the Caribbean Basin area.'39
of the Caribbean . . . the East bloc would sell Jamaica its films for a dollar." NEWSWEEK,
supra note 122.
"' See generally Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative, supra note 93, at 391 (letter of
Jack Valenti). For example, the MPAA has gone to court in Freeport, the Bahamas, to stop
a hotel from picking up satellite delivered movies and piping them into guests' rooms. See
Footprints, supra note 13, at 57.
133 Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative, supra note 93, at 402-03. The companies assert-
ing infringement must attempt to show that the motion pictures had been published simul-
taneously in the United States and Canada. Id. at 403. See supra notes 70-73 and accompa-
nying text.
134 See Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative, supra note 93.
"I Id. at 403. The copyright law of Panama, a country that like the United States, ad-
heres to the Universal Copyright Convention, does not provide for the protection of motion
pictures. Inasmuch as Panama does not protect Panamanian motion picture producers, it is
under no obligation to protect foreign producers.
131 See generally id. at 403-04.
137 Id.
118 Id. at 404. In Venezuela, such registration requires the filing of a Spanish synopsis of
the plot of each motion picture and program. Id.
3, The MPAA was instrumental in having a provision included in the CBI authorizing
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B. The Caribbean Basin Initiative: Bilateral Agreements and
Congressional Initiatives
1. Copyright Provisions
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (Caribbean Economic Recovery
Act or CBI) is a bilateral agreement between the United States
and twenty-seven countries and territories in the Caribbean Basin
region.14 ° The CBI seeks to promote the economic development of
the area by providing duty-free treatment and other economic ben-
efits to countries designated by the President of the United States
as eligible to receive such benefits. 41 Of the twenty-seven countries
eligible to be designated as beneficiaries, only seven have yet to be
designated as such.1 42
Section 212 of the CBI authorizes the President to proclaim, in
the form of a one-way free trade arrangement, 4 3 duty-free treat-
ment for eligible articles from designated Caribbean countries
which satisfy both the mandatory and discretionary requirements
for attaining beneficiary status.'4 4 The seven mandatory require-
the President of the United States to withhold benefits under the CBI from those countries
where television stations rebroadcast programs transmitted by satellite without the Ameri-
can movie owners' consent. See MPAA, supra note 112, at 57. The MPAA also has asked
the President to determine whether the copyright act of a particular country provides both
protection and appropriate remedies against copyright infringement. Id.
"' The CBI was signed into law on August 5, 1983. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery
Act, Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 211, 97 Stat. 384 (1983) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2701). See
also MPAA, supra note 112, at 56-57. The agreement actually is called the Caribbean Basin
Economic Recovery Act, and is a scaled down version of the CBI which President Reagan
proposed in 1981. Clasen, The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and Its Implica-
tions for Foreign Private Investment, 16 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. POL. 715 (1984) (stating that the
CBI represents the first time that the United States has granted preferential trade treat-
ment on a regional basis).
141 See MPAA, supra note 112, at 57; CBI, §§ 211-219.
142 The list of countries from which the President may designate beneficiary countries
include: Anquilla, Antiqua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Domi-
nica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trin-
idad and Tobago, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Saint Christopher-
Nevis, Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)
(West Supp. 1984). Of those countries, only Antiquilla, the Bahamas, Guyana, Nicaragua,
Surinam, Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands have not been designated ben-
eficiaries. Proclamation No. 5133, 48 Fed. Reg. 54453 (1983); Proclamation No. 5142, 49 Fed.
Reg. 341 (1984).
143 19 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West Supp. 1984).
144 For a general discussion of these mandatory and discretionary requirements, see Re-
cent Development, International Trade: Elimination of Tariffs on Caribbean Products, 25
HARV. INT'L L. J. 245 (1984).
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ments'" and eleven discretionary considerations are expressed in
Presidential directives.""
The designation requirements which specifically secure copyright
protection for United States owners include prohibiting the Presi-
dent from designating a country as a beneficiary "if a government
entity in such country engages in the broadcast of copyrighted ma-
terial, including films or television material belonging to the
United States without their express consent."'' "
In addition, discretionary considerations, which promote the
purpose of the act but are not mandatory, require the President to
take into account:
the extent to which such country provides under its law ade-
quate and effective means for foreign nationals to secure, exercise,
and enforce exclusive rights in intellectual property, including
patent, trademark, and copyright rights;""
the extent to which such country prohibits its nationals from
engaging in the broadcast of copyrighted material, including films
or television material belonging to United States copyright own-
ers without their express consent. 49
The mandatory requirement is directed at government owned
broadcasting systems, such as the Jamaica Broadcasting Com-
pany. '5 The discretionary criteria complement the mandatory con-
dition by requiring the President to consider the effectiveness of a
particular nation's laws in preventing private individuals from en-
gaging in satellite piracy.' 5'
The mandatory requirement is subject to presidential waiver if
the President determines that the designation of a country as a
beneficiary country would be in the United States' national or eco-
nomic interest. 5 2 Congress intended that the President exercise
this waiver only in exceptional circumstances, as shown by the leg-
islative history:
In agreeing to make the broadcast piracy condition subject to a
M The seven mandatory requirements may be found at CBI, § 212(b), 97 Stat. 384, 386-7
(1983) (to be codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2702).
141 Id. § 212(c).
147 Id. § 212(b)(5).
141 Id. § 212(c)(9).
141 Id. § 212(c)(10).
'50 See MPAA, supra note 112, at 120.
15 Id.
152 See CBI, § 212(b). The President, however, may only waive paragraphF (1), (2), (3),
and (5) of § 212. Id.
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national interest waiver by the President, the conferees do not
intend to permit any lessening of efforts to ensure that Caribbean
nations cease unauthorized interception of satellite signals em-
bodying programs owned by U.S. Copyright owners. . . . The
waiver should only be exercised where the interests of American
copyright holders will be protected in regard to both the permissi-
ble scope of acquisitions and compensation.' 53
Once the President designates a country as a beneficiary country,
he also is authorized to withdraw or suspend that designation if he
determines that as a result of changed circumstances the nation in
question no longer meets the mandatory condition. 54
The CBI explicitly protects the interests of program contributors
when it addresses the unauthorized "broadcast of copyrighted ma-
terial, '1 55 including program material received not only in the form
of broadcast signals but also in the form of videocassettes. The
CBI does not expressly mention the theft of satellite signal trans-
missions though; 56 accordingly, the CBI's copyright provisions fo-
cus on the content of the signal, rather than on the signal itself.
The CBI's focus, therefore, is the opposite of that of the Brussels
Convention, which does not regulate the content of satellite sig-
nals. 157 As a result, the interests of broadcasting organizations are
only indirectly protected. If program contributors have copyright
protection, and broadcasting organizations are assured of royalty
payments to Caribbean users because of the CBI, broadcasting or-
ganizations will not have to pay program contributors additional
fees when broadcast coverage is expanded by unauthorized broad-
casts. On the other hand, the legislative history of the CBI often
explicitly refers to the act of intercepting and retransmitting satel-
lite signals for rebroadcast. 158 Protection of the satellite signal as
well as the interests of the broadcasters thus should be implied
from the CBI's definition of "broadcast."
163 H.R. REP. No. 266, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 55, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 675, 697.
"' See CBI, § 212(e). The President may not terminate such a designation unless at least
sixty days before such termination, he has notified the House of Representatives and the
Senate, and has notified such country of his intention to terminate the designation, together
with the considerations entering into such a decision. Id. § 212(a)(2).
Id. § 212(c)(10).
'" See generally CBI, § 212.
"B See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. See generally Hearings, Caribbean Ba-
sin Initiative, supra note 93, at 399-401.
"" See, e.g., Hearings, Caribbean Basin Initiative, supra note 93.
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2. Sanctions
The significance of the CBI to United States program owners is
that it offers them more effective protection than could be ob-
tained from the other international agreements which afford copy-
right protection. The CBI succeeds because it provides sanctions
that ensure the observance of the treaty's obligations." 9 Particu-
larly effective is the sanction excluding offending countries from
receiving economic aid. If a Caribbean nation should offend the
property rights of United States nationals, punishment is applied
indirectly; the United States tells that nation in effect, "if you
don't cooperate, you can't participate and reap the benefits."6 0
Under the CBI's mandatory criteria, if a government of a Carib-
bean country engages in the unauthorized rebroadcast of material
copyrighted in the United States without paying the obligatory
royalty fees, that country is barred from participating in the treaty
and may not receive the benefits of duty-free concessions.' Fail-
ure to observe the discretionary criteria, such as when a country
permits its nationals to engage in the rebroadcast of copyrighted
program material, also will be relevant in determining whether or
not the sanction should be applied.'2
Denying economic benefits to those countries which fail to pro-
tect the property of United States nationals is for the most part a
novel approach in United States bilateral trade relations and inas-
much as the copyrights of American owners are protected, is
unique to the CBI. While foreign aid has rarely been denied to
those countries which fail to protect United States property rights,
the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961163 and the Trade Act of 1974164 provide authority for such
'" See generally H.R. REP. No. 266, supra note 153.
... Hickenlooper Amendment, 77 Stat. 386 (1963) (as amended, 78 Stat. 1013 (1964)), 22
U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(1970). It is arguable that the sanction of non-participation is an arbitrary
exercise of a superpower's advantageous position of strength and wealth over a dependent
developing country. When the developing country, however, realizes the advantage of rela-
tions with the United States as provided for in the CBI, the sanction restrains the Carib-
bean country from acting against both its best interest and the interest of the international
community, should it be tempted to disregard the customary standards and moral obliga-
tions of protecting another nation's citizens' property rights from an unlawful taking with-
out compensation.
"' See generally CBI, § 212(b)(2)(B), (C)(5). This designation will be withheld unless the
President determines that "prompt, adequate, and effective compensation has been or is
being made to such citizen, corporation, partnership, or association." Id. § 212(b)(2)(C)(i).
1e' See generally id. § 212(c).




The Hickenlooper Amendment requires the President to sus-
pend assistance to any government which has "nationalized, expro-
priated or seized ownership or control of property owned by U.S.
citizens or by business associations which are more than 50 precent
beneficially owned by U.S. citizens, unless the expropriating coun-
try promptly arranges to compensate such taking at full value. 1 65
Whether the Hickenlooper amendment also addresses copyrighted
intellectual property which may be unlawfully taken by a foreign
government is unclear.
Similarly, the Generalized System of Preferences of the Trade
Act of 197416 provides that the President shall not grant benefi-
ciary status for unilateral preferential duty-free treatment to those
developing countries that nationalize, expropriate, or otherwise
seize United States property either without making provisions for
"prompt, adequate, and effective compensation," or without enter-
ing into "good faith negotiations" to provide such compensation in
accordance with international law, or without submitting a dispute
over compensation to arbitration.6 7 The protection of United
States copyright material is not explicitly addressed in this provi-
sion." As with the Hickenlooper Amendment, therefore, it is un-
clear whether the Trade Act provision conditioning tariff prefer-
ences on the protection of United States property encompasses
copyrighted intellectual property unlawfully taken by a foreign
government.
A similar copyright provision to that of the CBI has been pro-
posed recently in the House of Representatives as an amendment
to Section 620 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.69 An identi-
cal amendment to the proposed House amendment was introduced
in the Senate as a part of a Senate bill amending the Foreign As-
sistance Act of 1961 to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1984
1013 (1964) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976)).
1"4 Trade Act of 1974, Title V, Generalized System of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461,
2462(b)(4) (1976).
105 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976).
19 U.S.C. §§ 2461, 2462(b)(4) (1976).
117 See id. §§ 2462(b)(4)(A), (D)(i)-(iii). This provision of the Trade Act prohibiting pref-
erential treatment also applies to those countries that have taken steps to repudiate or nul-
lify an existing contract or agreement with either a United States citizen or a corporation,
partnership, or association at least 50% owned by United States citizens. Id. §
2462(b)(4)(B).
, See id. § 2462(b).
'' H.R. REP. No. 192, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 81-82 (1983).
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for international security and development assistance.17 ° The Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations adopted the amendment pro-
posed in the Senate. 17'
These proposed amendments direct that the President, "in de-
termining the level of assistance to a country under the Foreign
Assistance Act, the Agriculture Trade and Development and Assis-
tance Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, shall consider
the extent to which the government of that country permits a gov-
ernment-owned entity or nationals of that country to engage in the
broadcast of copyrighted material (including films and television
material) belonging to the U.S. copyright owners, without their ex-
press consent."'' 72
The amendments further provide that if the President deter-
mines that a government-owned entity of a country engages in sat-
ellite piracy, the level of assistance provided that country for the
fiscal year 1984 may not exceed one-half of the amount proposed
for that country in the congressional presentation materials. 73 The
President may waive this restriction on the funding level if he re-
ports to Congress that a waiver is in the national interest.7 If
these amendments become law, then all bilateral trade agreements
must conform to the amendments and the extent of trade benefits
will be tied to the extent of copyright protection provided.
In practice, the ultimate success of the CBI in providing ade-
quate protection to the American program owners remains to be
seen. Given the Reagan administration's increasing foreign policy
interest in this sensitive region, 75 it is questionable whether the
Administration will enforce the CBI sanction and withhold eco-
nomic benefits should there be a violation of the agreement. The
Reagan administration possibly may justify the application of the
CBI's national interest waiver by claiming that without the ex-
panded trade opportunities offered by the CBI, the developing
countries of the Caribbean will be unable to deal with their eco-
"I S. REP. No. 146, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1983).
171 Id. at 8. The original bill was ordered reported on May 12, 1983 by a vote of 15-0. Id.
1.2 See H.R. REP. No. 192, supra note 169.
173 See id. at 82.
174 See id. at 81-82.
175 See generally Pastor, Sinking in the Caribbean Basin, 60 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1038
(1982). The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America issued in
January of 1984, known as the Kissinger Report, identifies Central America as an area of
vital interest to the United States, and, as such, recommends that the United States support
a commitment of financial and other resources to the region to help strengthen and insure
stability in the region.
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nomic problems and will remain vulnerable to Marxist interven-
tion.' 76 Most Caribbean nations, however, have agreed to comply
with the CBI conditions. 177 They have agreed to take steps to deter
the unauthorized broadcasts of United States satellite programs
without compensation and to negotiate with United States pro-
gram owners to permit further satellite reception. 78 These comply-
ing countries accordingly have been designated as CBI benefi-
ciaries.' 79 The President has yet to exercise the waiver provision.
Thus, because the existing multilateral agreements to which the
United States is a party fail to provide adequate protection to
United States program owners, and until an effective scrambling
system can be devised, the United States' recent move toward bi-
lateral copyright relations and congressional initiative is the most
effective immediate solution for dealing with satellite piracy in the
Caribbean Basin region.
," See id.
177 See generally supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
178 See generally id.
', See supra note 142.
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